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Abstract 
This paper documents a research project to examine the relationship between 
major defense program managers’ attributes and the outcomes of their programs.  It 
develops a model based on the research hypothesis that program manager (PM) 
professionalism is positively correlated with program outcomes.  Dependent 
variables consist of metrics, such as cost variance, that indicate program outcomes.  
Independent variables consist of PM attributes, such as tenure duration, along with 
several extraneous variables, such as the program commodity (e.g., ships, aircraft).  
Data were obtained from Selected Acquisition Reports for major defense acquisition 
programs for the years 1997–2010.  Expert interviews were recorded and used to 
frame various aspects of the analysis and conclusions.  No significant correlation 
was found between any of the independent variables and program outcomes.  The 
findings suggest that (1) further research is needed to determine good predictors of 
program outcomes; (2) policy-makers should look to sources other than the PM as a 
cause of poor outcomes; and (3) a contingency approach to PM career management 
is appropriate.  
Keywords: Defense acquisition; program managers; program management; 
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Executive Summary 
The professionalism of defense acquisition program managers (PMs) has 
been an important issue in policy discussions on defense reform for the past fifty 
years.  Numerous sources have identified the lack of professional qualifications 
(e.g., training, education, experience) among PMs as a contributing factor to 
unfavorable outcomes such as cost overruns and schedule slips.  In 1990, Congress 
enacted the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) with the goal 
of professionalizing the workforce, including PMs, to help achieve acquisition reform.  
Such actions presume that enhanced PM attributes contribute to improved 
program outcomes, yet no studies have attempted to validate this presumption.  This 
paper documents a research project to examine the relationship between PM 
attributes and the outcomes of their programs.  The project develops a model based 
on the research hypothesis that PM professionalism is positively correlated with 
program outcomes, and it conducts appropriate statistical testing and analysis.  
Dependent variables consist of metrics, such as cost variance, that indicate program 
outcomes.  Independent variables consist of PM attributes, such as tenure duration, 
along with several extraneous variables, such as the program commodity (e.g., 
ships, aircraft).  Data were obtained from Selected Acquisition Reports for major 
defense acquisition programs for the years 1997–2010.  Expert interviews were 
recorded and used to frame various aspects of the analysis and conclusions.  
The findings provide insights into policies to pursue increased PM 
professionalism as a component of acquisition reform.  Specifically, no significant 
correlation was found between any of the independent variables and program 
outcomes.  The findings suggest that (1) further research is needed to determine 
good predictors of program outcomes; (2) policy-makers should look to sources 
other than the PM as a cause of poor outcomes; and (3) a contingency approach to 
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Introduction 
For over fifty years, the professionalism1 of program managers (PMs) charged 
with the acquisition of major weapon systems has been an important issue in policy 
discussions on defense reform in the U.S. (Baumgartner, 1979; Denny, 1985; Fox, 
1974, 1984, 1988; Ladner, 1983; Peck & Scherer, 1962).2 Numerous studies and 
reports from academia, the Department of Defense (DoD), General Accounting Office 
(now Government Accountability Office [GAO]), Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), and various commissions have identified the lack of professional qualifications 
(e.g., training, education, experience) among PMs as a contributing factor to 
undesirable acquisition program outcomes such as cost overruns and schedule slips 
(Blue Ribbon Commission, 1986; DoD, 1989; Lockwood, 1985).   
To address this issue, Congress during the 1980s and 1990s enacted 
legislation—most notably, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA; 1990)—designed to enhance professional attributes of DoD PMs 
(Lockwood, 1986, 1990; Mavroules, 1991; Snider, 1996).  These actions established 
standards for a variety of PM attributes and qualifications such as minimum levels of 
training, education, experience, and tenure-in-office requirements to reduce PM 
turnover.  Concern with this issue has also been evident in studies that seek to 
determine desired PM attributes and competencies to be imparted through training, 
education, or experience, with the objective of improving acquisition outcomes 
(Crawford, 2002; Cullen & Gadeken, 1990; Gadeken, 1994, 2002; McVeigh, 1994; 
Tragar, Hausmann, & Sayala, 2008).  
                                            
1 “Professionalism” and “professional” in this report refer to standards, characteristics, and attributes 
of persons or groups with specialized knowledge, skills, and experience required for membership in a 
profession. “Professionalize” and “professionalization” refer to means by which one is made 
professional.  While few argue that acquisition or program management is a profession, most agree 
that professionalism is desirable for managers of defense acquisition, as this report will show.    
2 This report presumes that the reader has working knowledge of the main structural features of the 
U.S. defense acquisition system, including program management, and is familiar with the long-
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A. Issue 
Despite these measures to improve PM professionalism, observers continue 
to judge that acquisition outcomes generally have not improved (see, for example, 
GAO, 2010a, 2011a).  At the same time, studies continue to point out the need for 
enhanced PM professionalism as a component of acquisition reform (Assessment 
Panel, 2005; Defense Business Board [DBB], 2011).  This apparent failure of these 
efforts calls into question the conventional wisdom regarding the extent to which PM 
professionalism influences the outcomes of very large, complex, and, because of 
their large budgets, often politically-charged defense acquisition programs.  Indeed, 
this researcher has found no studies that support the presumption that PM 
professionalism is related to program outcomes.  
B. Purpose 
This report documents a research project to examine the conventional 
wisdom surrounding PM professionalization, specifically, the view that PM attributes 
are related to program outcomes.  Essentially, the project entails development of a 
model based on the research hypothesis that PM professionalism is positively 
correlated with program outcomes, along with appropriate statistical testing and 
analysis.  Dependent variables consist of several metrics, such as cost variance, 
that indicate program outcomes.  Independent variables consist of PM attributes, 
such as duration in office, along with several extraneous variables, such as the 
program commodity (e.g., ships, aircraft, missiles).  Data were obtained from a 
database of annual Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) for major defense 
acquisition programs for the years 1997–2010.  Expert interviews were recorded and 
used to frame various aspects of the analysis and conclusions.  
C. Benefit 
To the extent that the research hypothesis (conventional wisdom) may be 
supported, the extent to which the DoD has taken a proper approach in pursuing 
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shown.  Findings of positive correlations between PM professionalism and program 
outcomes may indicate that even further investments to enhance PM qualifications 
may be warranted.  On the other hand, if PM qualifications are uncorrelated with 
program outcomes, it may be concluded that meaningful reform is possible only 
through other means, for example, radical overhaul of the entire acquisition system 
(see, for example, Lockwood, 1985, p. 5).  
D. Organization 
Following this introduction, the report provides a policy and literature review 
that documents in more detail the historical context of, legislation related to, and 
relevant scholarship on the issue of PM professionalization.  The report then turns to 
develop various hypotheses and models that are suggested by that discussion, and 
it describes the data to be employed.  It then presents the statistical analyses and 
provides interpretation of the results.  The report concludes with a summary of 
findings and policy recommendations.   
E. Challenges 
This project entails several challenges that should be acknowledged at the 
outset.  First, defense acquisition represents a controversial public policy issue 
around which there is little consensus (except, perhaps, on the need for reform).  
Thus, any models and data that purport to capture and describe factors contributing 
to program outcomes are subject to criticism.  Second, the fidelity of SAR data may 
be questioned, since it is reported by program management offices and not 
automatically collected nor audited.  Third, the models in this project should 
reasonably and logically attempt to account for the contributions of PM attributes to 
program outcomes.  One would expect, however, that those contributions would not 
necessarily be manifested in any single time period, but rather may occur both while 
the PM is in office and after the PM has left office.  Some simplifying assumptions 
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II.  Policy Review 
This section provides a background of policy pertaining to the issue of PM 
professionalism.  The policy section consists of summaries of selected relevant 
legislation and reports by commissions, committees, and bodies like the GAO and 
CSR; these are presented roughly in chronological order.   
A. The Second Hoover Commission 
From 1953 to 1955, the second Hoover Commission’s 19 task forces and 
committees conducted a comprehensive review of federal executive branch 
functions, organization, and policies.  Their evaluation criteria emphasized 
preservation and enhancement of Constitutional concerns such as rule of law, 
separation of powers, Congressional power of the purse, and civilian control.  They 
also addressed, however, the economic and efficient operation of federal bureaus, 
reflecting taxpayer concerns with waste and duplication of effort which the first 
Hoover Commission had documented (MacNeil & Metz, 1956, pp. 13–17).    
When asked which of the Commission’s 314 recommendations he would 
judge as the single most critical, Hoover named the recommendation to set up a 
senior civil service (MacNeil & Metz, 1956, p. 29).  His choice reflected the view that, 
considering the growing complexities of 20th century governance, professional 
administrators were essential to achieve the reconciliation of efficient management 
within a Constitutional framework of law and politics.  This perspective is evident not 
only in the Commission’s recommendations on managers for defense acquisition,3 
but also in almost all legislative and commission recommendations regarding PMs 
since then. 
                                            
3 Because acquisition had not yet entered general usage, the Commission used terms like supply and 
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The need for program management. The Commission noted that the DoD’s 
organizations and processes were ill-suited for the acquisition of 20th century 
weaponry and that, due to complexities of requirements and operations, a “single 
integrated program” (MacNeil & Metz, 1956, p. 245) is required to develop and 
produce a technically advanced defense system.  This view reflects the emergence 
of project management (thus also the position and role of the PM) during these 
years as a discipline for managing complex and unique acquisition efforts, such as 
the Manhattan Project and development of the first U.S. intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (Baumgartner, 1979, pp. 3–4).  
Specialists vs. generalists.  The Commission found that the military’s 
preference for generalists in the uniformed ranks was inconsistent with the 
specialization needed to address the increasing complexity of defense management, 
especially since many key management positions were filled by uniformed personnel 
(MacNeil & Metz, 1956, pp. 268–269).  In particular, the Commission cited the 
military Services’ practice of frequently rotating officers in and out of administrative 
and operational positions as detrimental to efficient management (p. 246).  It 
recommended that, with necessary Congressional approval, the DoD develop a 
personnel system that would provide career-trained managers for functional areas 
such as acquisition.  Such a system would address specialized requirements for 
training, assignments, rotations, and promotions, both for uniformed and civilian 
personnel (pp. 269–270).  Such recommendations promote the view of the PM as a 
professional member of a specialized career field.   
Civilian vs. military control.  The Commission remarked on military officers’ 
general “anti-economic and unbusinesslike” attitude that, understandably, favors 
getting as many resources necessary to do their job (i.e., win armed conflicts), as 
opposed to getting along with as little as possible (MacNeil & Metz, 1956, p. 198).  It 
opined that “[t]he management aspect of national defense … requires specialized 
skills and attitudes normally found among civilians” (p. 273).  While recognizing the 
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operational employment of proposed weapons system (also recognized in many of 
the studies cited in subsequent sections), the Commission advocated strengthening 
and increasing civilian control of military administrative functions and increased 
application of business methods, particularly in supply-related activities (MacNeil & 
Metz, 1956, pp. 268–269).  These positions presaged policy initiatives in later years 
to increase the numbers of civilians in PM positions and to emphasize business 
skills in PM training.  
B. Early DoD Professionalism Actions 
In 1965, the DoD published its first regulations on the required qualifications, 
training, and tenure durations for acquisition PMs.  These were revised in 1971 and 
1974, and again in 1986, to reflect evolving legislative requirements.   
In 1964, the DoD established the Defense Weapon Systems Management 
Center at Dayton, OH, for the purpose of training defense acquisition PMs, mainly 
via a 10-week Project Management Course.  It was replaced in 1971 by the Defense 
Systems Management School (later College [DSMC]) at Fort Belvoir, VA, which was 
intended to provide in-depth knowledge and preparation on advanced management 
concepts to prospective PMs (Layton, 2007, pp. 6–7).  PM training continues at Fort 
Belvoir to the present under the Defense Acquisition University (DAU).  
From the late 1960s through the 1980s, each of the military Services also 
established its own programs to train PMs, for example, the Army’s PM 
Development Program (Baumgartner, 1979, p. 100) and the Navy’s Weapon System 
Acquisition Management and Materiel Professional programs (Fox, 1988, p. 201). 
C. Commissions during the 1970s 
The Fitzhugh Commission.  The 1970 report of President Nixon’s Blue Ribbon 
Defense Panel, chaired by Gilbert Fitzhugh, presented the first in-depth examination 
of weapons acquisition as part of its comprehensive review of national defense 
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those found by the Hoover Commission.  Specifically, the Fitzhugh Commission 
found that the personnel systems of the military Services did “not facilitate career 
development in the technical and professional activities, such as research and 
development [and] procurement” (Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 1970, p. 2). 
Regarding PMs, it found “[no] indication of consistent efforts … to select Program 
Managers from among those officers who have the most promising potential. … [A 
PM] should possess both managerial and technical skills and experience in the 
operational employment” of the system under development (p. 80).  It made 
extensive recommendations for improvement, including several focused on the PM, 
as follows: 
 Establishing career specialty codes for military PMs, along with 
selection and training criteria to ensure an adequate supply of qualified 
officers; 
 Increasing the number of qualified civilian PMs; and 
 Increasing the duration of PM assignments and allowing for overlap of 
incumbent and replacement PM assignments to enhance program 
continuity and stability (Lockwood, 1985, p. 2).  
The Commission on Government Procurement.  Reporting two years after the 
Fitzhugh Commission, this Congressionally chartered commission addressed the 
same general issues of procurement problems and reform.  It had few 
recommendations regarding the PM professionalism issue, however, other than to 
increase the number of civilians as major PMs as a means to increase managerial 
expertise and reduce turnover in that position (McKinney, Gholz, & Sapolsky, 1994, 
pp. 5, 13).  
D. Congressional Interest and Actions during the ’70s and 
’80s  
As early as 1954, Congress had expressed concern that frequent rotations 
and short assignment durations among PMs were “disturbing and harmful to the 
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resurfaced occasionally, for example, in testimonies like those of the 1970 Fitzhugh 
Commission, of Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard in 1971 (Fox, 1974, p. 200), 
and of Admiral Rickover in 1971 when commenting on the inexperience, lack of 
skills, and short assignments of PMs in the DoD (Lockwood, 1985, pp. 11–12).  The 
PM professionalism issue was typically presented in the context of concerns with 
acquisition management in general, like the GAO’s (1979) report on government 
procurement which included criticisms of the lack of qualifications among DoD PMs.  
Former Congressional staff members4 Colleen Preston (2011) and Jon 
Etherton (2011) both note that Congressional attention to PM tenure reflected its 
concerns with accountability, since frequent rotations made it difficult to hold a PM 
accountable for program shortcomings.  As Preston put it, “[W]hen program 
managers came in to testify before members of the committee about their program, 
we got a lot of, ‘It didn’t happen on my watch’” (2011).  Thus, lengthening PM tenure, 
whether by using civilian PMs to a greater extent or by mandating minimum tenure 
lengths, would serve the dual purposes of providing managerial stability to enhance 
program outcomes and, in the case of poor outcomes, helping to ensure that the 
responsible PM could be held accountable for those outcomes.  
Exacerbating the tenure problem was the perception in the DoD that 
acquisition was not a particularly attractive or career enhancing field.  One issue was 
that PMs were perceived to have, as Fox put it, “minimal authority [with] maximum 
responsibility” (1984, p. 156).  That is, they had nominal charge over their programs, 
but with little real authority because of the many overseers and stakeholders who 
held sway over their programs’ direction (Etherton, 2011).  Further, acquisition didn’t 
appear to have the same level of promotion opportunities as operational career 
fields.  Gansler (2011b) has noted the absence of acquisition professionals in the 
most senior flag officer ranks of the DoD during these years.  Regarding the four-star 
                                            
4 Preston served as General Counsel to the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed 
Services Committee; Etherton served on the professional staff of the Senate Armed Services 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 22 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
general commander of Army Materiel Command (the Army’s principal acquisition 
agency), four consecutive commanders had no acquisition experience, which sent 
clear signals to junior acquisition professionals about their career field: “[I]f you look 
up and see that the people above you don’t have any acquisition experience, you 
know that [experience] is not going to be emphasized.  Career planning for 
acquisition wasn’t really important” (Gansler 2011b).  Hence the view among 
reformers of the importance of structural changes to the DoD’s acquisition career 
management systems.   
In 1984, two years after President Reagan signed an executive order 
directing the establishment of career management programs for professional federal 
employees, a Senate Armed Services subcommittee began the first series of 
Congressional hearings targeted specifically on the issue of PM professionalism. 
These hearings coincided roughly with passage of the first legislative provisions in 
1984 and 1985 (Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1985; Department of 
Defense Authorization Act for 1986).  This legislation directed the lengthening of PM 
assignment durations to four years or the completion of a major program milestone, 
and for PMs, requirements for minimum training (mandatory attendance at DSMC) 
and experience (a minimum of eight years in acquisition-related assignments, two of 
which must be with major systems acquisition; Lockwood, 1985, pp. 3–4, 13, 15).  
According to Etherton (2011), then-Senator Dan Quayle, chairman of the 
Defense Acquisition Policy Subcommittee, took a different tack on the PM 
professionalism issue in the mid-1980s.  After meeting with several PMs (and 
hearing the “responsibility without authority” complaint referred to in this section), 
Quayle decided to focus on empowering them, an initiative that led to creation of the 
Defense Enterprise Program (DEP; enacted in the National Defense Authorization 
Act for 1987 [1986]).  Something of a managerial experiment, the DEP authorized 
the DoD to nominate selected programs that would have reduced regulatory burdens 
and reporting requirements.  Ideally, this would allow those PMs to have greater 
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improving PM accountability.  The DEP encountered resistance within the DoD, 
however, and as Congressional leadership changed over the next few years, it 
proved to be short-lived. 
In 1986, the GAO issued a detailed report on the acquisition workforce, 
concluding that DoD PMs in general lacked the appropriate training, education, and 
experience needed for the challenges of managing acquisition programs (GAO, 
1986).  
Throughout the 1980s, PM tenure remained the principal and most intractable 
professionalism reform issue for Congress (Etherton, 2011).  One reason was the 
prominence of the personnel subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees in 
Congress which “ruled the roost” (Etherton, 2011) on any military personnel matters.  
Another reason was competing priorities about how to achieve lengthened tenure, 
whether through, for example, mandates for increased numbers of civilian PMs, or 
for establishment of dedicated career fields that would allow military PMs to serve for 
longer durations. 
E. Executive Branch Actions during the 1980s 
The Carlucci Initiatives.  Only a few months after President Reagan’s 
inauguration in 1981, Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci introduced a set 
of over 30 diverse measures (subsequently known variously as the Defense 
Acquisition Improvement Program [DAIP], or more informally, the Carlucci Initiatives) 
intended to improve acquisition outcomes.  Among the initiatives was “Increase 
program stability” through measures such as increased PM tenure.  Although some 
of the initiatives resulted in limited progress, by 1984 the DoD’s commitment to the 
DAIP had largely dissipated (Munechika, 1997, pp. 6–9).      
The Grace Commission.  President Reagan’s Private Sector Survey on Cost 
Control, the Grace Commission, addressed the entire scope of government operations 
to address waste in spending, as its name suggests.  While making many acquisition-
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professionalism generally repeated prior calls for better trained and more experienced 
PMs (Grace Commission, 1984). 
The Packard Commission.  In late 1985, President Reagan established the 
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, chaired by former Deputy 
Defense Secretary David Packard, in response to the rash of acquisition “horror 
stories” during the mid-1980s (Blue Ribbon Commission, 1986, p. 1).  Because its 
major task was to evaluate the entire U.S. defense acquisition system, the 
Commission also commented on the professionalism issue.  Assuming the central 
importance of the PM position (Berteau, 2011) and the necessity of experience for 
success (Gansler, 2011b), the Commission found that, compared to that of private 
industry, the defense acquisition workforce is “undertrained, underpaid, and 
inexperienced” (p. 28).  While supporting the legislation cited previously, it affirmed 
the importance of further improvements to PM training and career development, both 
for military and civilian members.  
Secretary of Defense Cheney’s 1989 Defense Management Review generally 
echoed the Packard Commission’s findings on the state of the acquisition workforce 
(Mavroules, 1991, p. 18).  Because recommendations for improvement efforts were 
developed by the individual military Services, implementation plans varied 
significantly across the DoD (Layton, 2007, pp. 10–11).    
F. The 1990 House Armed Services Committee (HASC) 
Report 
By the late 1980s, interest in PM professionalism in the context of continuing 
poor acquisition outcomes had grown to the point that Congress was considering 
major reform legislation (Etherton, 2011; Preston, 2011).  According to Rep. 
Mavroules, Congress reflected a consensus that most previous efforts to reform the 
acquisition system had focused on processes and structures, and that what was 
presently needed was a focus on people.  This consensus, however, was based 
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workforce reform legislation, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) 
chartered an “in-depth analysis of the state of the acquisition workforce” (HASC, 
1990, p. 1) to focus on the following four questions (p. 1): 
1. Are acquisition managers, including PMs, being appointed with the 
required qualifications, and are they remaining in their positions for the 
minimum four-year duration? 
2. Is there a career program to develop professional and qualified 
personnel, both military and civilian?  
3. Does the workforce reflect an appropriate mix of military and civilian 
personnel? 
4. What impediments exist to workforce professionalism, and how may 
those be overcome? 
The 776-page HASC report provided detailed and comprehensive data on 
almost all facets of the workforce’s qualifications, providing unprecedented insights 
and a much-needed empirical basis for subsequent legislation.  The report’s findings 
generally supported the momentum in Congress for major workforce legislation.  For 
example, it found the following (Mavroules, 1991, pp. 17–21): 
1. Fewer than half of major PM positions were filled with graduates of the 
statutorily required PM course at Fort Belvoir. 
2. Since 1984, only six of 94 major PMs had remained in their 
assignments for the statutory four-year (or major milestone completion) 
requirement. 
3. The DoD’s career programs for PMs lacked key elements leading to 
professionalism. 
4. While civilians made up over 90% of the total acquisition workforce, 
only about 10% were assigned to major PM positions. 
The report also found differing levels of attention to PM professionalism 
among the three military Services.  For example, only the Air Force had a dedicated 
professional career development and certification program for military PMs.  
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experience) than the Army or Navy, as well as a higher percentage (97%) of PMs 
with at least eight years of acquisition experience than either the Army (81%) or the 
Navy (71%).  Regarding PM tenure, the least experienced Navy PMs had an 
average tenure of 41 months, while the more experienced Air Force PMs averaged 
only 25 months; Army PMs averaged 29 months (HASC, 1990, pp. 32–45).   
G. Differences in PM Career Management Among the Military 
Departments 
Differences in the career management approaches of each of the military 
departments had been evident prior to the HASC report.  Preston (2011) and 
Etherton (2011) both describe the Air Force as having the most well-developed 
career management policies and procedures for PMs.  As noted previously, the Air 
Force had a dedicated career path and was, as Preston put it, “growing true 
business managers from the very outset” (2011).  Etherton (2011) explained the Air 
Force’s priority on PMs as a consequence of its higher capital–labor ratios than 
either of the other Services.  
The Army’s PM career program envisioned accessing mid-level officers from 
the operational ranks and providing developmental assignments prior to their 
selection for PM by a centralized selection board.  While the Army’s program was 
not as well developed as the Air Force’s, Baumgartner (1979, pp. 99–103) wrote in 
glowing terms of Army PMs and their professional qualifications, referring to them as 
“princes of the realm.”  
The Navy was recognized as having the least developed PM career program.  
Preston recalls, 
[T]hey were pulling people right off a ship, rotating through a short tour, 
turning them into program managers, and thinking that if they sent them to 
DSMC … that was going to be enough. … [T]hey would be capable of making 
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One interviewee, a former Navy PM who chose to remain anonymous, 
attributed the Navy’s approach to its historical preference that its PMs be proven 
leaders with recent operational experience in the program’s domain (e.g., a 
submariner as PM of a submarine program).  The Navy saw career Air Force PMs 
as essentially “civilians wearing uniforms,” because they had little to no operational 
experience.  Business expertise and program continuity, in the Navy’s model, were 
best provided by civilian deputies to the uniformed PMs.      
As might be expected, these career management differences among the 
three departments complicated the task of PM reform efforts by both Congress and 
the DoD.  Resistance was particularly strong from the Air Force, which—perhaps 
with some justification—felt that its program was already strong, and that it did not 
need “interference” from outside (Preston, 2011).   
Etherton (2011) noted that the military departments’ PM career programs 
were focused only on uniformed members:  
Whether [career management for military PMs] was adequate was another 
question, but on the civilian side there was no equivalence. ... If you were a 
civilian you didn’t have the same career opportunities as your military 
counterpart.  [Congressional reformers wanted] to create room for civilian 
program managers to operate more effectively in the system and have more 
opportunities.   
This new focus on civilians was related to the goal of making acquisition an 
attractive professional career field, as described by Etherton (2011): 
…so that someone coming in from the outside who was a talented manager 
or had some interest in public service would look at the Acquisition Corps as 
something to be sought after—to make it more attractive, to make it 
something that would have special standing. 
H. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) 
Enacted in November 1990 as part of the 1991 Defense Authorization Act, 
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only for PMs, but for other acquisition specialists as well.  It required the Secretary of 
Defense to establish policies and procedures for acquisition career management 
and to ensure their uniformity throughout the DoD.  Some of its main provisions 
regarding PMs included the following:  
 Establishment of designated career fields, career managers, career 
advisory boards, and career paths for advancement; 
 Establishment of an Acquisition Corps with certification levels in each 
acquisition career field, along with training, education, and experience 
requirements necessary for certification at each level; 
 Limitations on preferences for military personnel and requirements to 
increase numbers of civilian PMs; 
 Establishment of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) for the 
professional education and development of the workforce; 
 Reinforcement of the four-year/major milestone tenure requirement for 
major PMs; and 
 Reinforcement of the requirement to attend the PM course prior to 
assignment, along with experience requirements: for a major PM, eight 
years of acquisition experience, two of which must be in a major 
program office; for a nonmajor PM, six years of acquisition experience.   
Waivers could be granted for these last two requirements.   
Etherton (2011) noted that policy-makers intended that the DAWIA (1990) 
and other reforms, such as the establishment of the program executive office (PEO) 
structure (Horgan, 1995), be mutually supportive regarding enhanced PM 
professionalism and accountability.  It was presumed that removing managerial 
layers between the PM and milestone decisions authorities, along with establishing 
clearer lines of reporting and authority, would enable better decision making by 
better trained and more experienced PMs. 
Compared with the years leading up to the DAWIA (1990), relatively little 
policy attention was paid to the PM professionalization issue following its passage 
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sweeping reforms were for the most part adequate and that time was needed for 
their proper implementation.  It also reflected the DoD’s concern with larger issues of 
strategic human capital planning (GAO, 2002), which was sorely needed after the 
major acquisition workforce reductions during the 1990s.  
One unintended consequence of the DAWIA (1990) was described in an 
anecdote related by a senior DoD acquisition official who chose to remain 
anonymous.  At a meeting during the mid-1990s, the official inquired as to the quality 
of acquisition personnel compared to ten years previously.  A 3-star flag officer 
replied, “Of course, it’s lower. … I have 36 O-6s5 coming up [for assignment] this 
year, and I have 42 jobs. … There was a time when I had 42 O-6s and 31 jobs.  You 
could weed [the weaker performers] out; we’re not able to weed anymore.”  Thus, 
the DAWIA’s certification and assignment standards appear to have had the effect of 
reducing the pool of available senior officers to the point that, at least according to 
this anecdote, “best qualified” criteria for selection to PM were rendered essentially 
meaningless.    
I.  Post-DAWIA Interest in PM Professionalization 
Roughly ten years after the DAWIA’s (1990) passage, major PMs resurfaced 
as an issue of interest, mainly regarding the problem of brief tenures.  For example, 
an unpublished report in 2001 provided data on major PM tenure since passage of 
the DAWIA, noting that on average, DoD PMs had failed to meet its statutory 
requirements (Office of the Director, 2001). 
In 2005, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) Project 
called for the PM tenure requirement to be established at the point of formal program 
initiation and proceed through completion of operational tests in order to enhance 
leadership stability (Assessment Panel, 2005).  In 2008, the GAO reported once 
again on the issue of short PM tenure durations, stating that frequent program 
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manager turnover has “potential to impact acquisition outcomes on individual 
programs” (p. 2). The GAO noted: 
[F]or 39 major acquisition programs started since March 2001, the average 
time in system development was about 37 months.  The average tenure for 
program managers on those programs during that time was about 17 
months—less than half of what is required by DoD policy. (p. 11)  
While not attributing adverse program outcomes to this tenure issue, the GAO 
concluded that outcomes in terms of cost, schedule, and performance had not 
improved since 2000.  
The  National Defense Authorization Act for 2007 (2006).  Provisions of this 
legislation put a different emphasis on major acquisition PMs.  Congress called for 
the DoD to increase PM empowerment and responsibility through revised guidance 
on their qualifications, resources, tenure, and accountability.   
A year later, in reporting to Congress on its progress toward meeting these 
requirements, the DoD described acquisition as consisting of two related 
environments (2007, pp. 6-9). “Big A” acquisition is the larger DoD institutional 
environment that, in addition to strategic acquisition management, also entails 
requirements management and resource management, two activities that are 
typically outside a PM’s sphere of influence. “Little a” acquisition is the managerial 
environment of activities within a PM’s ability to influence. The DoD stated that even 
with Congressionally directed PM enhancements that might enable improvements in 
little a acquisition, improved outcomes were not likely without improvements to the 
Big A components of the acquisition system (2007, p. 8) the GAO rendered a similar 
opinion only three months later (2007, p. 7). This represented a substantive step back 
by DoD’s acquisition leadership from the conventional wisdom regarding PM 
professionalism and program outcomes. 
Business Executives for National Security (BENS).  This group, consisting of 
several industry leaders and former senior government officials (e.g., Norm 
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recommendations for reforming defense acquisition.  Like other commissions 
mentioned previously, it addressed a wide range of issues, including the acquisition 
workforce and major PMs, but it naturally reflected industry’s perspectives. Pertinent 
recommendations included strengthening the role of industry in workforce training 
(BENS, 2009, p. 32), implementing private-sector organizational forms and 
management practices, improving PM training and experience, and lengthening 
durations of PM tenure (p. 34).  Despite all of the professionalizing actions taken by 
the DoD since the DAWIA (1990), the report noted, “the acquisition career field is not 
viewed as a profession in the same sense as are operational billets” (BENS, 2009, 
p. 35). 
Defense Business Board (DBB).  In December 2010, Under Secretary of 
Defense Carter chartered the DBB to conduct a review of the DoD’s PMs and make 
recommendations for improving their effectiveness based on private sector best 
practices.  The DBB conducted its review and provided its report four months later 
after interviews with OSD staff, acquisition executives, six PMs, and representatives 
of eight large firms (DBB, 2011, pp. 1–2).  It found “compelling reasons” to change 
the way the DoD manages its PMs (p. 2), specifically regarding the prevalence of 
short assignment durations that “negatively affect” acquisition programs (p. 2).  
According to the DBB, industry perceived that the DoD’s acquisition 
performance is complicated by absences and turnover of military PMs who tend to 
be in charge of major programs.  It reported that, while private sector PMs enjoyed 
“increased PM tenure, continuity, and business acumen,” the DoD’s military PMs 
tended to be “risk adverse [sic]” due to their inexperience and excessive oversight 
requirements (pp. 2–3).  The DBB offered two choices for reform: Professionalize 
PMs (in the sense of creating a “career destination” for them, as in a true profession 
such as law or medicine), or reserve major PM positions for civilians who can serve 
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J. Summary of Policy Review 
This admittedly lengthy review is provided to make the following points: (1) 
the issue of PM professionalism has been a feature of defense acquisition reform 
policy for over fifty years; (2) numerous policy initiatives during those years have 
attempted to make PMs professional; and (3) because the PM issue persists, those 
attempts have provided less than satisfactory results.  Notably absent from this 
review, however, is any policy analysis that attempts to establish a relationship 
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III.  Literature Review 
Because little research directly addresses the relationship between PM 
professionalism and program outcomes, this section also summarizes some relevant 
research from the field of human resource management. 
A. Early Studies 
Scholarly attention to the PM coincides roughly with the rise of modern project 
management in the mid-20th century with highly complex weapons projects such as 
the Manhattan Project and the Atlas project (Kwak, 2005).  The leadership and skills 
of the two generals who managed these projects—Leslie Groves and Bernard 
Schriever, respectively— have been widely cited, reinforcing the view of the PM’s 
importance in achieving successful results (Baumgartner, 1963, 1979).  Gaddis’ 
Harvard Business Review article (1959) described the unique roles and 
competencies of this new type of manager.  Peck and Scherer’s (1962) seminal 
study of defense acquisition noted the importance of PM experience and the 
disruption to programs that occur with frequent PM rotations (pp. 92–93).  The 
influential works of Katz (1974) and Mintzberg (1975) documented the attributes and 
competencies of effective managers. 
B. Fox’s Studies 
J. Ronald Fox’s two books (1974, 1988) remain the two most influential and 
comprehensive analyses of U.S. defense acquisition management.  In each, Fox 
devotes an entire chapter to the PM, with emphasis on the professionalism issue, 
covering the material summarized in the previous chapter in much greater detail.  
While lauding the efforts of individual PMs to do their best in a flawed system, Fox 
presents trenchant critiques of an acquisition culture that steadfastly resists reform, 
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In these books, Fox makes claims regarding the PM issue that are relevant 
for this present study.  For example, he states, “The capability of the program 
manager and his staff obviously determines the ultimate success of each weapon 
acquisition program” (1974, p. 180).  Similarly, he cites “the reality that an effective 
and efficient acquisition program requires advanced program management skills, 
based on extensive practical training and years of program management 
experience” (1988, p. 196).  Unfortunately, he offers no support for such claims.  
Thus, while he does give compelling evidence both for the lack of PM 
professionalism and for unfavorable program outcomes, he simply assumes the 
former contributes to the latter.  Considering the widespread influence of Fox’s 
works, it is unsurprising that many apparently accept the “reality” of this relationship 
(see, for example, Blue Ribbon Commission, 1986, pp. 27–28; Lockwood, 1985, p. 
1).  
C. Project Management Studies 
Project management literature contributes to the present study in several 
ways.  First, the question of defining and measuring project success, especially for 
complex projects with diverse stakeholders, generates much attention (see, for 
example, Pinto & Slevin, 1988).  Agreement on specific success criteria is elusive, 
and most agree on only general standards like overall mission accomplishment, 
stakeholder satisfaction, and conformance to quality, cost, and schedule targets  
(Baker, Murphy, & Fisher, 1988; Murphy, Baker, & Fisher, 1974).  This problem is 
exacerbated by the lack of data on achievement of cost, schedule, and quality 
targets, whether because of proprietary concerns (mainly in the private sector) or 
simply because data have not been systematically collected.  As a result, most 
studies rely on stakeholders’ subjective assessments to determine program 
outcomes (Crawford, 2002).  
Several of these studies have attempted to quantify the benefits of project 
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outcomes in the private sector (see, for example, Ibbs & Reginato, 2002; Morris, 
2002).  None, however, has focused on the PM or on defense acquisition projects. 
Numerous studies have focused on the issue of desired PM competencies 
(Geoghegan & Dulewicz, 2008; Posner, 1987; Thamhain, 1991), to include defense 
acquisition PMs (Cullen & Gadeken, 1990; Gadeken, 1994, 2002; McVeigh, 1994).  
All of these studies, however, relied on subjective assessments, both for success 
factors and for program outcomes.  Because they examined competencies (e.g., 
leadership skills), these studies did not address any of the criteria, such as training 
and tenure, that received attention in prior critiques of PM professionalism.    
Like Fox, then, PM scholars have assumed, but failed to provide evidence of, 
a relationship between PM competencies or attributes and the outcomes of the 
programs they lead. 
D. Human Resource Management (HRM) Literature 
The difficulty in identifying relationships between PM professionalism and 
program outcomes is illustrated by human resource management (HRM) studies that 
address the issue of “return on investment” (ROI) from training, education, and other 
development programs (Dionne, 1996; Kirkpatrick, 1994; Rowden, 2005).  As Wilson 
(2004) notes, many organizations take a “leap of faith” when it comes to HR 
development programs, presuming their inherently positive effects for all concerned, 
including for the bottom line.  ROI studies attempt to replace faith with evidence, 
whether motivated by executive concerns with profitability (Bartel, 2000; Phillips, 
1996) or by HR specialists’ concerns to justify their budgets (Geber, 1996; Institute 
of Management & Administration, 2003).   
Despite occasional claims to the contrary (e.g., Phillips, 1997), most scholars 
find significant difficulties in establishing relationships between HR development 
efforts and effects such as increased profitability for any other than relatively 
formulaic or routine tasks (see, for example, Mikesell, Wilson, & Lawther’s [1975] 
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1998; Swanson, 1998).  For managerial and executive development efforts, issues 
of training validity (treatment effects from the program) and performance validity 
(transferring performance from the program to the job) present major challenges 
(Goldstein, 1979).  These challenges would be even more severe in the context of a 
highly complex major defense acquisition program (Fox & Miller, 2006).  Further, 
unless the development program has been designed and implemented with 
evaluation in mind—with concomitant resource investments—metrics and data are 
typically unavailable for analysis (Chmielewski & Phillips, 2002).  
Such challenges are addressed generally but extensively in the literature of 
public program and policy evaluation (see, for example, Babbie, 2009; Langbein, 
2006; Mohr, 1995; Poister, 2003).  
The GAO (2010b) recently addressed the issue of measuring the effects of 
training in the defense acquisition workforce.  The GAO reported that DAU, which 
has authority for acquisition training in the DoD, measures training effectiveness 
using Kirkpatrick’s (1994) four-level model, as follows: 
 Level 1: Reaction—the trainees’ reaction to and satisfaction with the 
training.  
 Level 2: Learning—the extent to which learning has occurred because 
of the training.  
 Level 3: Behavior—the application of learning to work from changes in 
trainee’s behavior.  
 Level 4: Results—the impact of the training on the agency’s 
organizational results (e.g., ROI; increased profitability).    
The GAO noted that, while DAU attempts to measure its training 
effectiveness for the first three levels, it has not used Level 4 assessments 
extensively (2010b, pp. 14–15).  Among other findings, it concluded that the DoD 
needs metrics for assessing “how certification training contributes to organizational 
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this conclusion, stating its preference for existing metrics related to workforce 
capacity and proficiency, rather than new metrics on results (GAO, 2010b, p. 39). 
While the HRM literature focuses on the organizational effects of HR 
development efforts, it has implications for studies that would examine 
organizational effects due to managerial attributes and competencies, for example, 
the effects of PM professionalism on program outcomes.  Specifically, the same 
challenges (e.g., external validity, availability of data) are present for the latter as for 
the former.  These issues are also reflected in business theorists’ long-standing 
debates over the extent to which managerial competence contributes to firm 
profitability (Roquebert, Phillips, & Westfall, 1996; Skandalis, Liargovas, & Merika, 
2008). 
E. Summary of Literature Review 
To summarize the main points of this section, while some assume that PM 
professionalism and program outcomes are positively correlated, no study has 
attempted to validate that assumption.  Proximate research comes from HRM 
studies that seek to find relationships between HR development programs and 
organizational outcomes; these are, however, fraught with challenges in both 
method and data and have met with inconclusive results.  The following question 
remains: To what extent may the benefits of PM professionalism be based on 
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IV.  Research Hypothesis and Models 
The discussion to this point provides background for the following research 
hypothesis: PM professionalism is positively correlated with program outcomes.  
This study examines this hypothesis through the analysis of dependent variables 
that correspond to program outcomes and which are presumed to vary according to 
changes in independent variables related to PM professionalism.  This section 
presents the development of variables for multiple linear (ordinary least squares 
[OLS]) and logistic regression models, along with hypotheses for statistical analysis.  
Considering the methodological issues mentioned in the introduction to this report, 
the goal is for robust testing across a variety of specifications. 
A. Dependent Variables (Outcomes) 
Many have noted the difficulty in defining “success” in acquisition program 
outcomes, given the variety of stakeholders representing, for example, military, 
industry, political, and other interests (see, for example, Gansler, 2011a, pp. 129–
234).  Providentially, this study can avoid this problem, because most of the 
criticisms cited in prior chapters which focus on PMs’ lack of professionalism have 
emphasized adverse outcomes at the level of individual programs, such as cost 
increases, schedule slips, and performance shortfalls.  Thus, in this study, 
dependent variables are outcomes for individual acquisition programs and are 
functions of several independent variables for those programs.     
Percent unit cost variance (PUCV).  At program initiation, initial baseline cost 
estimates must be established against which subsequent cost estimates can be 
compared.  Estimates are prepared in several categories both for total costs and unit 
costs (i.e., total cost divided by quantity to be procured).  Because both total costs 
and unit costs can differ significantly among programs (e.g., the unit cost for a 
missile program may be dozens of thousands of dollars, while for a ship, perhaps 
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provides skewed results.  Accordingly, this study will use PUCV as a dependent 
variable.  For example, if in Year 1 the estimated baseline unit cost for a program 
was $1 million, and in Year 2 the estimate rose to $1.1 million, the variance was a 
positive (and unfavorable) 10%.6 
Occasionally, unit cost variance appears excessive, as in the case of program 
termination, when all program costs would be allocated to perhaps only a few 
developmental platforms.  Accordingly, this study sets plus and minus 100% 
variance as upper and lower limits and eliminates any data points outside these 
limits as outliers. 
PUCV will be examined in the following three forms: 
 PUCV PERIOD—PUCV reported in each SAR period 
 PUCV DURATION—PUCV in the last reporting period of a PM’s tenure 
duration7  
 PUCV NOMINAL—PUCV as a nominal variable with binary values 
“favorable” (if PUCV PERIOD or DURATION is unchanged or 
decreases) or “unfavorable” (if PUCV PERIOD or DURATION 
increases).   
Program breach.  A breach occurs, and must be reported, when an estimate 
of a cost, schedule, or performance parameter is determined to be significantly less 
                                            
6 Many circumstances could cause such a result, such as (1) cost increases due to poor initial 
estimates; (2) cost increases due to desired and beneficial changes (e.g., increased weapon system 
capability); or (3) changes in quantity to be procured.  The extent to which a PM’s professionalism 
might be determined to influence any such circumstances is problematical. 
Discussion on reasons for program cost growth, appropriate cost metrics, and the idea that cost 
growth in some circumstances may be justifiable and worthy, is reflected in the DoD’s responses to 
the recent GAO’s critical assessments of acquisition programs. See, for example, GAO, 2011a, pp. 
153, 179–180.       
7 Conceptually, this would be the period in which the PM should have the most influence over the 
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favorable than its baseline estimate.  Breaches fall into two main categories: Nunn–
McCurdy breaches8 and acquisition program baseline (APB) breaches. 
A Nunn–McCurdy breach (GAO, 2011b) occurs and must be reported when a 
major increase (ranging from 15% to 50%, depending on the specific criteria used) is 
determined to have occurred in a program’s current estimate of unit cost from the 
baseline estimate.  A Nunn–McCurdy breach is an indicator of potentially serious 
problems with a program, and reporting a breach triggers a variety of actions by 
higher authorities, including required reports to Congress on corrective actions that 
might include program termination.   
An APB breach occurs and must be reported when the current estimate for 
any of a program’s key parameters is determined to exceed its threshold (or 
minimally acceptable) value as defined in the APB.9  Because APB thresholds are 
the minimally acceptable values of the most important program parameters, the 
determination that any might not be achieved represents a serious issue, requiring 
the attention of higher authorities, along with appropriate corrective action.  
For this study, the breach variable will take on two nominal values: yes (if a 
program has experienced any type of breach) or no (if not).  Obviously, this 
dependent variable is very general and accounts for almost any adverse 
circumstance of sufficient importance to be reported to higher authorities.    
                                            
8 Named for Senator Sam Nunn and Rep. David McCurdy, co-sponsors of the provisions enacted in 
the Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1982 (1981).    
9   The APB is established at program initiation and represents its approved description in terms of 
key cost, schedule, and performance parameters, expressed as both objective (desired) and 
threshold values.  Examples of key parameters that might be included in an APB are as follows: 
 Cost—estimated total cost for each appropriation type (e.g., procurement, military 
construction); unit cost; ownership cost 
 Schedule—projected dates for major milestones, major tests, and initial operational capability   
 Performance—projected system attributes such as operational availability, range, airspeed,  
accuracy  
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B. Independent Variables 
The earlier discussion gave indications of several variables that, according to 
the research hypothesis, are presumed to contribute to program outcomes. 
PM tenure.  Longer tenures are presumed to contribute to favorable 
outcomes.  This is presented in two ways for each acquisition program, depending 
on the model specification: first, the number of months that a PM has been in the 
position as of a SAR period report date (TENURE PERIOD); and second, the total 
duration of the PM’s tenure in months (TENURE DURATION). 
PM status—military or civilian.  Programs with civilian PMs are presumed to 
have favorable outcomes; those with military PMs, less so.  This is a nominal 
variable with two values. 
Program component.  This variable denotes the program’s component, 
whether Air Force, Army, Navy, or DoD (joint programs) and is a nominal variable 
with one of these four values.  This variable is an admittedly blunt surrogate for PM 
training, education, and experience levels.  Such data were not readily available for 
individual PMs, nor were data available on whether a particular PM required a 
waiver from the statutory training, education, and experience levels required for 
assignment.  However, the discussion in section II.G. noted that (1) only the Air 
Force has a dedicated career path for its officers; and (2) Air Force PMs have more 
training and experience than either Army or Navy PMs, and Army PMs have more 
experience than Navy PMs.  Accordingly, Air Force programs are presumed to have 
better program outcomes than Army and Navy programs, and Army programs are 
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Null Hypotheses. The following null hypotheses follow: There is no 
relationship between program outcomes and 
 H10: duration of PM tenure, 
 H20: PM status, and 
 H30: program component. 
C. Extraneous Variables 
The following independent variables may influence the dependent variables 
but are not of interest to the question of PM professionalism: 
System complexity.  Unit cost (PAUC) is used as a proxy for the complexity of 
the system to be acquired.  Systems with higher unit costs (e.g., ships, aircraft) are 
assumed to have higher levels of complexity.  For simplicity, each program will take 
on the nominal value (Q1 – Q4) of the quartile in which its PAUC falls.   
Program commodity (e.g., ship, aircraft, missile).  Some commodities may 
have differing levels of risk due to factors such as technological maturity and the 
state of the U.S. industrial base, with concomitant potential effects on outcomes.  
This variable takes on a nominal value for one of eight program commodities listed 
in the next chapter. 
Program phase.  This variable has one of two nominal values: development 
or production.  This variable is associated with the relative maturity and risk of the 
program, which may be reflected in its outcomes.  
The model includes a lagged dependent variable to account for the prior 
period’s outcome. 
D. Multiple Linear Regression Model  
Based on the variables identified previously the general model for the 
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Outcomet = f(tenuret, statust, component, PAUC quartile, commodity, phaset, 
outcomet-1) 
(Component, PAUC quartile, and commodity are assumed unchanged over a 
program’s life.) 
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V.  Data 
This section describes the source of data for this study, explains the data 
elements that correspond to the relevant variables, and presents a summary of the 
data that were collected. 
A. Source of Data 
Data were obtained from the Defense Acquisition Management Information 
Retrieval (DAMIR) Purview10 system.  Data were taken from Purview’s records of all 
major defense acquisition program11 (MDAP) Selected Acquisition Reports12 (SARs) 
submitted between 1997—the first year for which Purview SAR data are available—and 
2010.  The data include any acquisition program that was designated as MDAP and 
which submitted a SAR during any of these years.13   
                                            
10 DAMIR Purview is an executive information system operated by the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (Acquisition Resources & Analysis); see 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/damir/. 
11 Defined as a DoD acquisition program that is designated as such by the Secretary of Defense and 
is not a highly sensitive classified program, that is estimated to require an eventual total expenditure 
for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than $365 million or an eventual total 
expenditure for procurement of more than $2.19 billion (both in FY 2000 constant dollars) 
(Department of Defense, 2008, p. 3-1). 
12 The Secretary of Defense must submit a SAR to Congress for each MDAP. The SAR reports the 
status of total program cost, schedule, and performance, as well as unit cost breach information. 
SARs are submitted annually and, on an exception basis, quarterly, when estimates for some cost 
and schedule parameters exceed their targets. (See section 10.9 of Defense Acquisition University, 
2011,)  
13 This study did not include the DoD’s chemical demilitarization programs. While these are 
sometimes included in lists of acquisition programs and are required to submit SARs, they differ 
significantly in that their objective is to destroy weapons rather than acquire them. 
The study also excluded the National Missile Defense program due to its extremely high unit cost (in 
excess of $20 billion), which is attributable both to its very complex “system of systems” nature and to 
its production as one single system (i.e., quantity of one).  Additionally, this program submitted only 
one SAR in 1999.  Other programs are also very complex, with very low production quantities (e.g., 
Warfighter Information Network–Tactical); however, they typically have submitted SARs in several 
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B. Data Elements 
Purview provided the following for each year in which an MDAP submitted a 
SAR: 
PUCV.  The reported percentage variance between the current estimate and 
the baseline estimate of Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC)14 is reported in the 
SAR.   Estimates are in base year dollars, where the base year is typically the year 
in which the MDAP was approved and its baseline established. 
Breach.  Details on any type of breach that occurred during the report period 
are given in the SAR.  
Tenure and Status.  The SAR provides identifying information (assignment 
date and rank, if military) for the current PM.  PM tenure for the current reporting 
period (TENURE PERIOD) is the difference in months between the PM’s 
assignment date and the date of the SAR.  PM total tenure (TENURE DURATION) is 
taken as the difference between the PM’s assignment date and that of his or her 
successor.  
Component.  The SAR identifies each program’s component. 
Phase.  The SAR gives information on program milestones, which allows for a 
determination of whether a program is in the development or production phase. 
PAUC.  PAUC is reported in each SAR in both base year and then year 
dollar. This study uses base year dollars. 
                                            
14 Defined as the estimated cost of the development, procurement, and military construction 
necessary to acquire a system, divided by the total number of fully configured end items (to include 
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Commodity.  The SAR classifies each program’s commodity according to the 
type of weapon or system it acquires.  For this study, the following eight 
commodities were used:  
 aircraft (fixed- and rotary-winged, including unmanned aerial vehicles);  
 ships (surface craft and submarines); ground vehicles (tracked and 
wheeled);  
 missiles (air and surface);  
 munitions (bombs, artillery projectiles, warheads);  
 command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I; radios, 
information systems); 
 space (satellites, launch vehicles); and 
 other (systems such as those for soldier support which do not fit in the 
other commodities).   
C. Data Summary 
This study used Minitab 16 for all data analysis. 
Overview.  Table 1 lists numbers of SAR submissions and programs by 
commodity and component for the years 1997–2010.  






Army DoD Navy Programs Air 
Force
Army DoD Navy
Space 128 0 0 15 Space 16 0 0 2
Aircraft 145 81 9 145 Aircraft 19 13 1 17
Missile 35 66 8 71 Missile 3 8 4 8
C3I 26 93 42 52 C3I 7 27 5 12
Ship 0 0 0 128 Ship 0 0 0 18
Munitions 39 38 0 31 Munitions 6 6 0 3
Ground  
Vehicle 
0 59 0 13 Ground 
Vehicle
0 7 0 2
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Figure 1 shows numbers of SAR submissions for programs by phase and 
component. 
 
Figure 1. SAR Submissions by Phase (D = Development; P = Production)  
and Component 
Program Complexity (PAUC Quartile).  Figure 2 provides bar charts depicting 
percentages of SAR submissions per quartile according to component and 
commodity.  As expected, Navy and Air Force programs, representing a 
preponderance of ship, space, and aircraft programs, appear to have the highest 
levels of complexity.  
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VI.  Data Analysis 
This section presents descriptive statistics, graphical data displays, and 
results of regression analysis, together with commentary on how these relate to the 
study’s hypotheses.  It begins with data on PMs and then moves to data on 
outcomes (the study’s dependent variables). 
A. PM Data 
PM Population.  Earlier discussion documented the interest of various 
commissions and study groups in the composition of the PMs according to status 
(i.e., military or civilian).  Table 2 presents data from the timeframe of this study 
(1997–2010) for the number and percent of PMs by status and according to their 
component and commodity.  Table 3 provides a comparison of PM status between 
this present study and the 1990 HASC Report discussed earlier.   
The data indicate roughly a 10% increase in civilian PMs of major programs 
over the past twenty years.  Considering that over 80% of PM positions remain 
occupied by military members, however, this increase likely would be insufficient to 
satisfy past commissions and groups that advocated increased levels of civilian 
PMs.  No striking differences are apparent from the distribution of PMs by 
component and commodity.15  
                                            
15 The sole component/commodity area in Table 2 in which civilian PMs were a majority—Air Force 
“other” programs—achieved this distinction by having four of five civilian PMs in only one program— 
the National Airspace System—during the 1997–1010 timeframe. Thus, the increase in civilians 
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Table 2. PM Data by Status, Component, and Commodity 
 
Table 3. Comparison of PM Status: Present Study and the 1990 HASC Report 
 Percent Military 
 This study 1990 HASC Report
Air Force 78 96 
Army 87 96 
DoD 88 -- 
Navy 86 94 
Total 84 96 
Figure 3 indicates that military PMs tend to be assigned more frequently to 
programs with the highest levels of complexity (i.e., highest PAUC) than civilian 
PMs, especially in the Army and Navy.  A two-sample T-test confirmed that PAUC 
for programs with military PMs (M = $497 million, SD = $1,477 million) is significantly 
Aircraft Space C3I Missile Munitions
Ground 
Vehicle Ship Other Total
Military          
Air Force 53 46 17 18 10 0 0 1 145
Army 33 0 32 20 19 23 0 2 129
DoD 5 0 17 3 0 0 0 3 28
Navy 51 3 16 30 11 4 43 1 159
Total 142 49 82 71 40 27 43 7 461
Civilian          
Air Force 14 11 2 3 8 0 0 4 42
Army 5 0 4 7 0 3 0 0 19
DoD 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 4
Navy 4 2 7 2 1 2 8 0 26
Total 23 13 15 13 9 5 8 5 91
Percent 
Military          
Air Force 79 81 89 86 56   20  
Army 87  89 74 100 88  100  
DoD 100  89 75    75  
Navy 93 60 70 94 92 67 84 100  




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 51 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
higher than those with civilian PMs (M = $224 million, SD = $489 million) (t(788) = -
4.59, p < .01).   
 
Figure 3. PM Status and PAUC Quartile 
PM Tenure.  This study has documented concerns with frequent PM turnover 
(short tenures in position) as contributing to unfavorable program outcomes.  
Statistics on PM tenure (TENURE PERIOD and TENURE DURATION) are given in 
Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary Statistics for PM Tenure 
Variable Mean Std 
Dev 
Median 
TENURE PERIOD (tenure for the SAR period in 
months) (N = 1251) 
17.3 12.92 16.0 
TENURE DURATION (total tenure duration in 
months) (N = 399) 
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Figures 4 through 7 provide graphical information in the forms of histograms 
and “box and whisker” plots16 of PM TENURE DURATION according to component, 
commodity, phase, and status.  
 
Figure 4. PM TENURE DURATION and Component 
 
Figure 5. PM TENURE DURATION and Commodity
                                            
16 Minitab uses the quartile method for calculating box endpoints. The top of the box is the third 
quartile (Q3); 75% of the data values are less than or equal to this value. The bottom of the box is the 
first quartile (Q1); 25% of the data values are less than or equal to this value. The upper “whisker” 
extends to the highest data value within the upper limit (upper limit = Q3 + 1.5 (Q3  Q1)), and the 
lower whisker extends to the lowest value within the lower limit (lower limit = Q1 1.5 (Q3  Q1)). 
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Figure 6. PM TENURE DURATION and Status (M = military; C = civilian) 
 
Figure 7. PM TENURE DURATION and Phase (Development or Production) 
Table 5 provides a comparison of PM tenure durations between this present 
study and the 1990 HASC Report discussed earlier.  On average, PM tenure 
durations have remained relatively unchanged over the past twenty years.  Average 
tenure has increased in the Air Force and Army and, while decreasing in the Navy, 
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Table 5. Comparison of PM Tenure: Present Study and the 1990 HASC Report 
 PM Average Tenure (months) 
 This study 1990 HASC Report 
Air Force 28.5 25 
Army 33.2 29 
DoD 28.8 -- 
Navy 36.0 41 
Total 32.4 32 
Discussion of PM Tenure.  No significant differences are apparent regarding 
commodity or phase. 
Figure 6 bears comment, as it indicates that tenure durations tend to be 
longer for military PMs.  This runs counter to the idea that civilians should be 
preferred for PM positions, since they would (supposedly) have less frequent 
reassignments and longer tenure durations than military members.  One possible 
reason for this phenomenon is that civilians might be appointed as “interim” PMs, 
with corresponding short tenures, pending assignments of military members.  If 
valid, this explanation would put the recent increase in civilian PMs in a different 
light.   
B. Dependent Variables—Graphs 
This section provides graphical analyses of each the study’s dependent 
variables in relation to the independent and extraneous variables. 
PUCV.  PUCV PERIOD and PUCV DURATION are examined together 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics for Percent Unit Cost Variance (PUCV) 
 
Figure 8 shows scatter plots for PUCV PERIOD and DURATION according to 
reporting periods in the timeframe of interest (1997–2010).  These outcomes appear 
to be uncorrelated with time, a phenomenon which, while not formally addressed in 
this study, has possible relevance to the professionalization issue.  Specifically, if the 
DoD has invested substantial resources in PM professionalization efforts over the 
past twenty years, one might expect to see improved outcomes.  This appears, 
however, not to be the case.  
 
Figure 8. PUCV and Time 
 Figure 9 shows scatter plots for these two in relation to PM TENURE 



































































































Variable N Mean Std Dev Median
PUCV PERIOD (N = 1168) 1169 -0.39 15.78 0.0 
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Figure 9. PUCV as a Function of PM Tenure 
Figures 10 through 14 show box plots for PUCV PERIOD and PUCV 
DURATION in relation to component, status, commodity, phase, and PAUC Quartile.  
Again, none of these exhibits evident correlation.  
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Figure 11. PUCV as a Function of Status (C = civilian; M = Military) 
 
Figure 12. PUCV as a Function of Commodity 
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Figure 14. PUCV as a Function of PAUC Quartile 
Discussion of PUCV.  Regarding Figure 10, a one-way ANOVA was used to 
test for PUCV PERIOD differences among the four components.  PUCV PERIOD 
differed significantly across components (F(3, 1164) = 4.01, p < .01).  Tukey’s 
comparisons (p = .05) indicate that the Army (M = -2.87, SD = 20.5) had significantly 
lower (favorable) PUCV PERIOD than both the Air Force (M = 0.29, SD = 15.85) and 
the Navy (M = 0.95, SD = 11.22), but the Army’s PUCV PERIOD was not 
significantly different than the DoD’s (M = -1.29; SD = 13.54).  Comparisons of 
PUCV PERIOD for the DoD, Air Force, and Navy were not statistically significant.  
This finding disconfirms H30 regarding a correlation between program 
outcomes and component, but not in the manner predicted.  The research 
hypothesis predicted that the Air Force would have the highest levels of favorable 
outcomes, but the data indicate the highest levels in the Army.  
Figure 11 bears comment, since it appears that the variance of PUCV is 
higher for military PMs than for civilian PMs.  An F-test for equal variances of PUCV 
PERIOD confirms that the variance for military PMs (264.2) is significantly higher 
than that for civilians (155.9; F = 0.59, 999, 167, p < .01).  Additionally, a two-sample 
T-test reveals that PUCV PERIOD for civilian PMs (M = -2.4, SD = 12.5) is 
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This finding disconfirms H20 regarding a correlation between program 
outcomes and status.  As predicted by the research hypothesis, PUCV outcomes for 
civilian PMs are significantly more favorable than for military PMs, and they have 
significantly less variance. 
This finding is tempered, however, by evidence presented earlier that civilians 
tend to be assigned to programs with lower complexity, and by evidence that PUCV 
is more favorable in less complex programs.  A one-way ANOVA was used to test 
for PUCV PERIOD differences among the four PAUC quartiles.  PUCV PERIOD 
differed significantly across quartiles (F(3, 1164) = 17.14, p < .01).  Tukey’s 
comparisons (p = .05) indicate that Q1 (M = -4.48, SD = 19.35) and Q2 (M = -2.99, 
SD = 16.44) had significantly lower (favorable) PUCV PERIOD than both Q3 (M = 
2.98, SD = 12.26) and Q4 (M = 2.21, SD = 13.20).  PUCV PERIOD differences 
between Q1 and Q2 were not significant, nor between Q3 and Q4.  Further 
investigation is warranted.     
Since, as noted earlier, tenure lengths for civilian PMs are in general shorter 
than those for military PMs, tenure duration may not be a significant factor; this will 
be examined subsequently via OLS regression.       
PUCV NOMINAL.  Instances of favorable and unfavorable PUCV are shown 
in Table 7.   
Table 7. Counts of PUCV NOMINAL 
Variable N FAVORABLE N UNFAVORABLE 
PUCV NOMINAL PERIOD  614 554 
PUCV NOMINAL DURATION 202 203 
 
Figure 15 shows the percentage distribution of PUCV NOMINAL PERIOD 
according to PAUC quartile.  As might be expected, programs with higher PAUC 
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Figure 15. PUCV NOMINAL PERIOD and PAUC Quartile 
Figures 16–18 depict the distribution of PUCV NOMINAL according to 
variables of interest.  Little is remarkable about these displays, except perhaps that 
for aircraft programs, unfavorable PUCV NOMINAL counts exceed favorable counts 
(Figure 18).  
 
Figure 16. PUCV NOMINAL PERIOD and DURATION (Favorable and  




























































do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 61 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 17. PUCV NOMINAL PERIOD and DURATION (Favorable and  
Unfavorable) and Tenure (Period and Duration) 
 
Figure 18. PUCV NOMINAL PERIOD and DURATION (Favorable and  
Unfavorable) and Commodity 
Discussion of PUCV Nominal.  Regarding Figure 16, a two-proportions test 
determined a significant difference in the proportions of favorable instances of PUCV 
NOMINAL between the civilian and military PM samples (Z = 3.91, p < .01).  This 
disconfirms H20 and supports the research hypothesis that program outcomes are 
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Breaches.  Figure 19 depicts the distribution of numbers of SAR breaches 
during reporting periods from 1997–2010.17  Again, as mentioned in the discussion 
on PUCV, one might have expected to see a downward trend, considering recent 
emphasis on PM professionalization; this appears, however, not to be the case. 
 
Figure 19. Counts of SAR Breaches, 1997–2010 
Figures 20–23 depict the distribution of breaches during 1997–2010 
according to variables of interest.  These are generally unremarkable except for the 
case that breaches exceed non-breaches for DoD programs and for space programs 
(Figure 22).   
                                            
17 The bars with the highest counts correspond to annual SAR submissions in December. The bars 
with lower counts represent exception SARs, as described earlier.  Annual SARs were not submitted 
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Figure 20. Counts of Breaches (Yes or No) and PM Status  
(Military = M or Civilian = C) 
 
Figure 21. Breaches (Yes or No) and PM Tenure (Period and Duration) 
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Figure 23. Breaches by Phase (D = Development; P = Production)  
and PAUC Quartile 
Discussion of breaches.  Regarding Figure 20, a two-proportions test 
determined a significant difference in the proportions of reported breaches between 
the civilian and military PM samples (Z = -2.77, p < .01).  This disconfirms H20 and 
supports the research hypothesis that program outcomes are positively correlated 
with civilian PMs.  When, however, the same tests were conducted within each 
quartile, a significant difference (Z = -2.12, p < .01) was found only in quartile 2 (Q2); 
no significant difference was found in the proportion of breaches according to status 
in Q1, Q3, or Q4.    
Summary—Graphical analysis of dependent variables.  This section has 
given an extensive set of depictions of relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables of interest.  For the most part, few correlations are evident 
from historical SAR data.   
The notable exception that emerges is the relationship between program 
outcomes and status: programs with a civilian PM are associated with favorable 
outcomes to a greater extent than those with a military PM.  Because tenure 
durations for military PMs tend to exceed those of civilian PMs, this difference is 
likely due to factors other than tenure.  The data indicate that military PM’s manage 
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complexity on outcomes is mixed.  Further attention is given to this issue in the 
following section.   
C.  Regression Analysis 
This section presents results of OLS regressions for the dependent variables 
representing program outcomes and the independent variables of interest. Recall 
that the general model for the outcome—PUCV or breach—of a program during time 
period t is as follows: 
Outcomet = f(tenuret, statust, component, PAUC quartile, commodity, phaset, 
outcomet-1) 
where component, PAUC quartile, and commodity are assumed unchanged over a 
program’s life.  (As nominal variables, status, component, commodity, and phase are 
made indicator variables in the regression equations.) For each outcome, the model 
for program i and time t is given by the following: 
PUCV PERIODit = αit + β1TENURE PERIODit + β2STATUSit + 
β3COMPONENT + β4PAUC QUARTILE + β5COMMODITY + 
β6PHASEit + PUCV PERIODit-1 
PUCV DURATIONit = αit + β1TENURE DURATIONit + β2STATUSit + 
β3COMPONENT + β4PAUC QUARTILE + β5COMMODITY + 
β6PHASEit + PUCV DURATIONit-1 
PUCV NOMINAL PERIODit = αit+ β1TENURE PERIODit + β2STATUSit + 
β3COMPONENT + β4PAUC QUARTILE + β5COMMODITY + 
β6PHASEit + PUCV NOMINAL PERIODit-1 
PUCV NOMINAL DURATIONit = αit + β1TENURE DURATIONit + 
β2STATUSit + β3COMPONENT + β4PAUC QUARTILE + 
β5COMMODITY + β6PHASEit + PUCV NOMINAL DURATIONit-1 
BREACHit = αit + β1TENURE PERIODit + β2STATUSit + β3COMPONENT + 
β4PAUC QUARTILE + β5COMMODITY + β6PHASEit + BREACHit-1  
Linear Regression Results.  Tables 8 and 9 provide unstandardized factor 
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Constant 1.065  
(0.767) 
-0.929    
(1.356) 
-0.307    
(1.434) 
0.261    
(1.307)   
0.225    
(1.686)    




TENURE PERIOD -0.085**  














(Relative to Civilian) 
 2.338*    
(1.312)   
2.577*    
(1.324)   
1.250    
(1.215) 
1.086    
(1.238)    
1.025    
(1.237)   
0.757    
(1.233) 
Component (Relative 
to Air Force) 
       
Army   -3.351***   
(1.220)  
-1.589    
(1.128)  
-1.243    
(1.331)  




DoD   -1.946    
(2.391)  
0.215    
(2.218)   
1.599    
(2.443)    
0.995    
(2.457)   
3.248 
(2.538) 
Navy   0.592    
(1.132) 
0.395    
(1.036)   
-0.076    
(1.212)   




PUCV PERIOD Lag    0.538***  
(0.028)  
0.529***  







       
Aircraft     0.827    
(1.584)    
0.517    
(1.589)   
-0.622    
(1.761) 
C3I     -1.818    
(1.983)   
-2.309    
(1.994)  
-1.888    
(2.066) 
Ground Vehicle     0.514    
(2.393)    
0.475    
(2.390)   
1.665    
(2.509) 
Missile     0.037    
(1.838)    
-0.173    
(1.838)  
1.963    
(2.017) 
Munitions     0.089    
(1.990)    
-0.144   
(1.990)  
3.752    
(2.335) 
Ship     2.054    
(2.093)    
2.413    
(2.097)   
2.140    
(2.182) 
Other     -0.536    
(3.361)   
-1.407    
(3.383)  





     1.839**   
(0.898)   
1.857**   
(0.900) 
PAUC Quartile  
(Relative to Q1) 
       
Q2       1.978    
(1.481) 
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(1.601) 
Q4       4.930*** 
(1.747) 
R-squared .005 .008 .019 .281 .285 .288 .302 
Adj. R-squared .004 .006 .014 .277 .275 .278 .290 
1. *, **, *** indicate significance at .90, .95, and .99 levels, respectively. 
2. Number of observations: 998 (when the lag factor is included); 1168 (when the lag factor is omitted). 
3. Variance inflation factors ranged from a maximum of 3.89 to a minimum of 1.03 (M = 2.16, SD = .89), 
indicating that multicollinearity was not high.  
4. The Durbin Watson statistic value (2.15) indicates the absence of autocorrelation in the sample.   




Constant 2.436    
(1.816) 
-0.123    
(2.334)  
0.677    
(2.404) 
-1.224    
(1.733) 
-2.716    
(2.309)   
-2.733    
(2.321)   













(0.040)   
-0.033  




(Relative to Civilian) 
 3.449*    
(1.983)  
3.573*    
(1.992)   
3.162**    
(1.417)   
3.304**    
(1.443)    
3.304**    
(1.445)   
1.818    
(1.404)   
Component 
(Relative to Air 
Force) 
       
Army   -3.624*    
(1.903)  
-0.637    
(1.409)  
-2.055    
(1.630)   
-2.068    
(1.639)   
-1.707    
(1.619)  
DoD   -0.351    
(3.327)  
1.638    
(2.426)   
0.130    
(2.752)    
0.094    
(2.785) 
1.639    
(2.994)   
Navy   -0.225    
(1.791) 
0.907    
(1.291)   
0.073    
(1.504)    
0.061    
(1.512)   




   0.753***  
(0.037)  
0.754***  
(0.038)   
0.754***  




(Relative to Space) 
       
Aircraft     1.739    
(1.998)    
1.715    
(2.020)   
-0.675    
(2.181)  
C3I     3.245    
(2.491)    
3.202    
(2.543)   
2.962    
(2.674)   
Ground Vehicle     5.689*    
(2.994)    
5.682*    
(3.000)   
5.710*    
(3.086)   
Missile     1.465    
(2.262)    
1.445    
(2.276)   
2.076    
(2.458)   
Munitions     1.497    
(2.469)    
1.483    
(2.477)   
2.985    
(2.805)   
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(2.671)    (2.683)   (2.739)  
Other     2.752    
(4.093)    
2.715    
(4.121)   
0.704    





     0.103    
(1.160)   
0.571    
(1.129)   
PAUC Quartile  
(Relative to Q1) 
       
Q2       1.244    
(1.804)   
Q3       4.303**    
(1.927)   
Q4       4.801**    
(2.164)   
R-squared .004 .012 .023 .557 .563 .563 .627 
Adj. R-squared .002 .007 .011 .549 .546 .544 .607 
1. *, **, *** indicate significance at .90, .95, and .99 levels, respectively. 
2. Number of observations: 348 (when the lag factor is included); 400 (when the lag factor is omitted). 
3. Variance inflation factors ranged from a maximum of 4.05 to a minimum of 1.07 (M = 2.20, SD = .90), 
indicating that multicollinearity was not high.  
4. The Durbin Watson statistic value (1.93) indicates the absence of autocorrelation in the sample. 
 
Discussion of Results.  Several points are evident from Tables 8 and 9.  First, 
R-squared (the coefficient of determination) is twice as large for PUCV DURATION 
as for PUCV PERIOD, which is likely attributable to the decrease in variation when 
reporting PUCV only once at the end of a PM’s tenure rather than reporting in each 
year of tenure.   
As expected, the lag variable in each model and iteration is significantly 
related to (p < .01) and accounts for most of the variance in the dependent variable.  
The independent variables of interest—tenure, status, and component—
explain only about 2% of the variance in the outcome, a finding which is confirmatory 
of the null hypotheses.    
Despite this last finding, the signs of the coefficients for two of the 
independent variables of interest—tenure and status—are in all cases in the 
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duration indicate that PUCV decreases as tenure increases, and the positive 
coefficient for status indicates that military PMs are associated with higher PUCV 
and civilian PMs with lower PUCV.  In only some cases, however, are these 
relationships significant; they are not significant in either full model. 
The directions of coefficient signs of the other independent variable of 
interest—component—are not as predicted by the research hypotheses.  Programs 
in the Air Force, due to its structural factors that promote PM professionalization, 
were predicted to have better outcomes than the other three components.  The 
negative coefficients for the Army in all cases, however, indicate that PUCV tends to 
be lower in Army programs; the same can be said in some cases for Navy and DoD 
programs.    
Regarding the extraneous independent variables, a few notable points can be 
made.  First, the signs of coefficients for phase and PAUC quartile are in the 
expected direction: PUCV in the production phase is expected to be lower than in 
development, and PUCV is expected to increase as PAUC increases.  Second, in 
both models, when a program is in the top two quartiles (Q3 and Q4), that 
relationship to PUCV is significant; thus, higher complexity is significantly related to 
unfavorable outcomes.  Third, phase is significantly related to outcomes in one of 
the models (for PUCV PERIOD); thus, developmental programs are associated with 
unfavorable outcomes.  Finally, little can be said regarding commodity, other than 
the obvious conclusion that it has little relationship to or explanatory power for the 
dependent variable.   
The results are statistically secure only for a few of the factors, in the sense 
that most of the standard errors exceed the magnitude of their coefficients. 
To summarize, these models must be judged to have very little explanatory 
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Logistic Regression Results.  Tables 10 through 18 give results of binary 
logistic regressions for PUCV NOMINAL PERIOD (favorable or unfavorable), PUCV 
NOMINAL DURATION (favorable or unfavorable), and BREACH (yes or no).  For 
each of these three dependent variables, a table of coefficients, a table of observed 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 71 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=






Constant -1.191***   
(0.363) 
 
TENURE DURATION 0.001 
(0.001) 
1.00 
Status: Military (Relative to Civilian) 0.423**    
(0.214) 
1.53 
Component (Relative to Air Force)   
Army 0.131    
(0.228) 
1.14 
DoD 0.032    
(0.436) 
1.03 
Navy 0.012    
(0.210) 
1.01 
PUCV NOMINAL PERIOD Lag 1.748***   
(0.143) 
5.74 
Commodity (Relative to Space)   
Aircraft -0.394    
(0.299) 
0.67 
C3I -0.807**   
(0.352) 
0.45 
Ground Vehicle -0.445    
(0.422) 
0.64 
Missile 0.102    
(0.343) 
1.11 
Munitions -0.638    
(0.399) 
0.53 
Ship -0.542    
(0.366) 
0.58 
Other -0.198    
(0.579) 
0.82 
Phase: Development (Relative to 
Production) 
-0.045    
(0.153) 
0.96 
PAUC Quartile (Relative to Q1)   
Q2 0.141    
(0.250) 
1.15 
Q3 0.670**   
 (0.270) 
1.95 
Q4 0.299   
 (0.290) 
1.35 
1. *, **, *** indicate significance at .90, .95, and .99 levels, respectively. 
2. Counts: Unfavorable—492 (event); Favorable—516 
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Table 11. Observed and Expected Frequencies: PUCV NOMINAL PERIOD 
Group 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unfavorable           
Observed 20 26 26 30 41 44 74 72 78 81 
Expected 17.5 23.5 28.1 32.1 28.3 54.5 66.7 72.3 78.2 80.9 
Favorable           
Observed 80 75 75 71 60 57 26 29 23 20 
Expected 82.5 77.5 72.9 68.9 62.7 46.5 33.3 28.7 22.8 20.1 
 
Table 12. Measures of Association: PUCV NOMINAL PERIOD and Predicted 
Probabilities 
Pairs Number Percent Summary Measures 
Concordant 191721 75.5 Somers’ D: 0.52 
Discordant 60632 23.9 Goodman-Kruskal Gamma: 0.52 
Ties 1519 0.6 Kendall’s Tau-a: 0.26 
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Constant -2.124***   
(0.723) 
 
TENURE DURATION 0.003 
(0.010) 
1.00 
Status: Military (Relative to Civilian) 0.122    
(0.357) 
1.13 
Component (Relative to Air Force)   
Army -0.084    
(0.424) 
0.92 
DoD 0.404    
(0.770) 
1.50 
Navy -0.356    
(0.394) 
0.70 
PUCV DURATION Lag 2.556***   
(0.289) 
12.89 
Commodity (Relative to Space)   
Aircraft 0.642    
(0.561) 
1.90 
C3I 0.665    
(0.687) 
1.95 
Ground Vehicle 0.951    
(0.777) 
2.59 
Missile 0.717    
(0.634) 
2.05 
Munitions 1.025    
(0.725) 
2.79 
Ship 0.321    
(0.708) 
1.38 
Other -0.056     
(1.088) 
0.95 
Phase: Development (Relative to 
Production) 
0.150    
(0.294) 
1.16 
PAUC Quartile (Relative to Q1)   
Q2 0.451    
(0.474) 
1.57 
Q3 0.678    
(0.506) 
1.97 
Q4 0.871    
(0.563) 
2.39 
1. *, **, *** indicate significance at .90, .95, and .99 levels, 
respectively. 
2. Counts: Unfavorable—183 (event); Favorable—151 
3. Goodness-of-Fit Test (Pearson): Chi-Square = 312.450, df = 297, 
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Table 14. Observed and Expected Frequencies: PUCV NOMINAL DURATION 
Group 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unfavorable           
Observed 8 9 9 12 10 21 25 30 27 32 
Expected 6.6 8.7 9.4 10.4 12.5 21.0 26.9 28.7 28.5 30.3 
Favorable           
Observed 25 25 24 21 24 12 8 4 6 2 
Expected 26.4 25.3 23.6 22.6 21.5 12.0 6.1 5.3 4.5 3.7 
 
Table 15. Measures of Association: PUCV NOMINAL DURATION and Predicted 
Probabilities 
Pairs Number Percent Summary Measures 
Concordant 22137 80.1 Somers’ D: 0.61 
Discordant 5359 19.4 Goodman-Kruskal Gamma: 0.61 
Ties 137 0.5 Kendall’s Tau-a: 0.30 
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Constant -0.548  
(0.383) 
 
TENURE PERIOD 0.002 
(0.006) 
1.00 
Status: Military (Relative to Civilian) 0.450**    
(0.219) 
1.57 
Component (Relative to Air Force)   
Army -0.084    
(0.233) 
0.92 
DoD 0.484    
(0.477) 
1.62 
Navy -0.178    
(0.215) 
0.84 
BREACH Lag 1.951***   
(0.146) 
7.03 
Commodity (Relative to Space)   
Aircraft -0.329    
(0.304) 
.72 
C3I -0.575  
(0. 362) 
0.56 






Munitions -1.176***    
(0.406) 
0.31 






Phase: Development (Relative to 
Production) 
0.290*   
(0.155) 
1.34 
PAUC Quartile (Relative to Q1)   
Q2 -0.722***    
(0.260) 
0.49 






1. *, **, *** indicate significance at .90, .95, and .99 levels, 
respectively. 
2. Counts: Yes—474 (event); No—534 
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Table 17. Observed and Expected Frequencies: BREACH 
Group 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unfavorable           
Observed 17 16 29 22 38 49 68 80 77 78 
Expected 15.4 21.9 25.2 27.8 31.8 50.7 68.8 72.7 76.4 83.4 
Favorable           
Observed 83 85 72 79 63 51 33 21 24 23 
Expected 84.6 79.1 75.8 73.2 69.2 49.3 32.2 28.3 24.6 17.6 
 
Table 18. Measures of Association: BREACH and Predicted Probabilities 
Pairs Number Percent Summary Measures 
Concordant 195659 77.3 Somers’ D: 0.55 
Discordant 56409 22.3 Goodman-Kruskal Gamma: 0.55 
Ties 1048 0.4 Kendall’s Tau-a: 0.27 
Total 253116 100.0  
 
Discussion of Logistic Regression Results.18  Regarding the models’ 
predictive qualities, the goodness-of-fit tests, with p-values ranging from 0.222 to 
0.369, suggest insufficient evidence that the models are inadequate to fit the data.  
This conclusion is supported by the general similarities between the observed and 
expected frequencies in each model, as well as the relatively high ratios of 
concordant to discordant pairs.  The summary measures of association (Somers’ D, 
Goodman–Kruskal Gamma, Kendall's Tau-a) range from 0.26 to 0.61, which 
                                            
18 Because these are logistic regressions, each of the estimated coefficients represents the log of the 
odds of an event, where odds are defined as the ratio of the event’s probability of occurrence over the 
probability of nonoccurrence. (The “event” is an unfavorable outcome [e.g., a PUCV increase or 
breach]).  For example, in Table 16, the coefficient of 0.450 for status (military) represents the change 
in the log of P(breach)/P(no breach) when the PM is military, with other variables held constant.  The 
estimated coefficient of 0.002 for tenure period is the change in the log of P(breach)/P(no breach) 
with a one-unit (1 month) increase in duration period, with other factors held constant.  
Regarding interpretation of odds ratios, those close to one indicate a minimal effect on the dependent 
variable.  In Table 16, the coefficient of -1.244 and odds ratio of 0.29 for commodity “other” may be 
interpreted as follows: “Other” commodity programs tend to have fewer breaches than other 
commodities (i.e., the negative sign of the coefficient indicates the event’s nonoccurrence), and the 
odds of “other” programs having a breach are 29% of the odds of the rest of the commodities having 
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indicates low to moderate predictive ability.  Overall, it cannot be said that any of the 
models have either low or high predictive qualities. 
Regarding the coefficients and odds ratios, the results reflect generally the 
same conclusions as the linear regressions above.  Specifically, the effect of 
component is mixed, with no evidence that outcomes of Air Force programs are 
better than those of other components.  As for the status variable, outcomes for 
civilian PMs are statistically better (p < .05) than for military PMs in two of the three 
models.  Results for phase and PAUC quartile are mixed.     
Finally, as in the OLS regressions, the factor for lag dominates other variables 
in its levels of significance, its odds ratios, and its contributions to the predictive 
power of the models.  To illustrate, when the logistic regression for BREACH (yes or 
no) was run again with all variables except lag, the measures of association ranged 
from only 0.12 to 0.24, indicating this particular model’s poor predictive quality. 
D. Data Analysis—Conclusions 
The null hypotheses may now be revisited in light of the graphical and 
regression analyses.19  Recall these were framed as follows: There is no relationship 
between program outcomes and 
 H10: duration of PM tenure, 
 H20: PM status, and 
 H30: program component. 
PM Tenure.  In only a few regressions was PM tenure found to be 
significantly related to the outcome.  In all regressions, the coefficient was 
                                            
19 The author conducted numerous variations on these models and tests, most of which are not 
presented here. For example, one individual made the suggestion to examine only the best 
performing programs (or, alternatively, the worst performers).  These excursions failed, however, to 
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determined to be very small, indicating little effect on the outcome for a unit change 
in duration.  Thus, H10 should not be rejected. 
PM Status.  Statistical tests indicated that outcomes for programs managed 
by civilian PMs were better than those managed by military PMs.  This difference 
was not related to tenure, and military PMs’ programs had higher complexity than 
those managed by civilians.  Regression results were mixed; several but not most 
regressions determined a significant positive correlation between favorable 
outcomes and civilian status.  In all regressions, the sign of the coefficient indicated 
better outcomes with civilian PMs.  Overall, however, the mixed results suggest the 
relationship is weak, and H20 is not rejected. 
Program Component.  This hypothesis was based on the presumption that 
outcomes of Air Force programs would be significantly better than those of other 
components.  In almost no cases, however, was this relationship evident.  In fact, 
outcomes of Army programs tended to be better than those of the other three 
components.  As noted, however, this is tempered by evidence that Army programs 
tend to be less complex than those of the other components.  Accordingly, H30 is not 
rejected. 
Summary.  On the whole, this analysis fails to reject the null hypotheses and 
thus fails to support the research hypothesis that PM professionalization contributes 
to improved program outcomes.  It cannot be ruled out, then, that the conventional 
wisdom about PMs and their influence on program outcomes may be entirely wrong, 
and that the professional attributes of a PM may actually have very little to do with 
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VII.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
This paper has argued that conventional wisdom portrays PM professionalism 
as a central factor in the success or failure of a defense acquisition program.  It has 
also presented analysis that fails to support this view.  Although such inconclusive 
analysis may render conclusions and recommendations problematical, it does 
suggest some meaningful points.   
A. Conclusions 
Further research is needed. Two possibilities remain: Either PM 
professionalism makes a significant difference, and the analysis here has failed to 
detect it, or it does not make a difference.  In either case, more analysis with better 
data and models are needed.  This study found no factor, other than a time lag 
factor, that is correlated with program outcomes.  This absence of correlation 
between outcomes and any of this study’s variables, including structural variables 
like commodity and phase, is unexpected.  Clearly, further research is needed in 
order to enable reasonably reliable predictions of a program’s future outcomes.20   
A few comments from the expert interviews indicate some alternative factors.  
Both Preston (2011) and Soloway (2011) suggested that the term “program 
manager” is a misnomer.  Preston noted that defense contractors manage DoD 
acquisition programs, and DoD PMs manage the contractors.  Soloway recalled a 
conversation with a PM who stated, “We’re not doing program management 
anymore. … We’re managing people, budget, and politics. … I don’t even do what I 
was really trained to do … from the technical side of program management.”  If valid, 
these comments help explain why the independent variables in this study were poor 
predictors of program outcomes, since none of the factors to which Preston and 
                                            
20 For example, Brown’s (2011) work in examining program interdependencies might contribute to a 
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Soloway refer was included in this analysis.  Accounting for these factors in future 
analysis, however, would entail new challenges, for example, in making them 
operational in a reasonable model (e.g., how to operationalize an acquisition 
program’s political factors and the PM’s involvement in those?) and in obtaining 
appropriate data.  In any event, these interview comments suggest the need for a 
revised or expanded view of the traditional role of PM. 
Other factors outweigh the PM’s influence. Scholars of defense acquisition 
(see, for example, Fox & Miller, 2006; Kronenberg, 1990) have noted the high level 
of complexity in defense acquisition programs.  Several interviewees in this study 
(Berteau, 2011; Etherton, 2011; Preston, 2011; Soloway, 2011) supported this view, 
suggesting that the range and influence of “non-PM” factors in MDAPs are large in 
comparison to PM-related factors.  This is consistent with DoD’s recent “Big A – little 
a” construct of acquisition consisting largely of activities that lie beyond the PM’s 
ability to influence, and it helps explain why the best managerial efforts of even the 
most professional PMs would fail to have significant effects on outcomes.  
This explanation is, however, incomplete.  It is reasonable to argue that, given 
sufficient time and resources, good policy and management could be instituted to 
address even large numbers of factors, assuming they are amenable to policy and 
management (i.e., well-characterized and relatively stable across time and 
programs).  That this has not occurred implies that these non-PM factors are 
idiosyncratic and unstable, that is, that every program is unique in the factors that 
determine its outcomes.  
Every program is different.  This study has implicitly assumed that MDAPs 
represent a homogeneous population.  Likewise, approaches to PM 
professionalization assume that programs are sufficiently similar to allow for 
standardized training and for experiences in one program to be managerially useful 
in others.  It may be argued, however, that all programs vary in their major features 
(e.g., requirements, technical characteristics, contractors) as well as in the major 
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economic circumstances, industrial capacity).  Environmental instabilities cause 
program instabilities.  Because each program faces unique and changing 
configurations of highly complex issues—whether operational, economic, political, or 
technological—each program differs in the extent to which it is open or amenable to 
management throughout its life.   
Because the circumstances of each program are complex, unique, and 
unstable, so too are the reasons for success and failure.  Preston (2011) described 
the MX missile program as follows: 
It was deemed as one of the most successful programs that the Air Force had 
ever had.  Why was that?  It was because Congress supported the program, 
[DoD] supported the program, it got all the funding it needed, and the 
technology was developed in time. … You could have the best program 
manager in the world [but] if the contractors can’t get the technology 
breakthroughs that they need [or] if Congress changes its mind halfway 
through a program and cuts the funding … you are going to have an 
unsuccessful program. 
If valid, this perspective helps explain the poor predictive power of this study’s 
models.  
Past policies inhibit PM professionalism.  The earlier background discussion 
touched on policy-makers’ desires to make program management a professional 
career field that would attract talented candidates for membership.  This presumably 
would entail actions such as establishing a professional body of knowledge, 
standards for admittance and progression, and a code of professional conduct.  
Such features would be the “ties that bind” members of the profession together.  In 
attempting to hold PMs accountable for program outcomes, however, policy-makers 
have diverted PMs’ focus away from professional considerations and toward the 
specific features of their individual programs.  To the extent that each program is 
unique, PMs have little in common upon which to build a professional career field. 
These conclusions have major implications for recommendations regarding 
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B. Recommendations 
With over thirty-five years of active service in the DoD, the author has no 
idealistic expectations regarding the likelihood of promoting and implementing 
significant changes where PMs are concerned.  Nevertheless, with the hope that 
policy-makers in both the Congress and the DoD might seriously consider them, he 
offers the following recommendations that follow from the previous discussion.  
Revise expectations of PM performance.  If PMs indeed can have little to no 
influence over program outcomes, it is unreasonable to attempt to hold them 
accountable for those outcomes.  Appropriate perspectives are needed as to what a 
PM can be expected to accomplish, along with criteria for performance evaluations 
(see, for example, Fox & Miller, 2006, pp. 177–196).  The earlier comments by 
Preston (2011) and Soloway (2011) describing what a PM really manages (e.g., 
people, budgets, politics, contracts) indicate some possibilities for areas in which the 
PM could have both responsibility and accountability, for example, administration 
and leadership of the program management office; quality of budget submissions; 
oversight of contractual arrangements; and actions to enhance the program’s 
political climate. 
Promote shared program ownership and accountability. In the past, policy-
makers have treated the PM position as an object for improvement: if the PM’s 
professionalism could be improved, program outcomes would improve.  This has the 
obvious effect of deflecting accountability from its proper place and onto an easy 
target—the PM.  The notion of the PM as the “single point of contact” was exposed 
earlier as reflecting policy-makers’ frustrations with having no one to blame for poor 
outcomes and, as indicated by the subsequent analysis, it has no correlation with 
those outcomes.  Therefore, if program outcomes are attributable to many 
participants and stakeholders, policy-makers should seek to promote a shared 
sense of ownership for those programs, for the sake of both managerial 
effectiveness and accountability.  Ideally, this would expand the extent of 
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Promote contingency approaches for PM career management.  The unique 
and changing nature of each acquisition program argues against a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to managing PMs.  It reduces emphasis on minimal qualification standards 
and elevates emphasis on experiential diversity.  One senior career management 
official related the view that PMs are best prepared for their jobs through a range of 
diverse educational and practical experiences.  This official, who chose to remain 
anonymous, used the metaphor of a spider web as an illustration that many different 
strands (career experiences) can lead to the center of the web, which represents a 
professionally qualified PM.  
Selection for PM might be accomplished according to “best fit” rather than 
“best qualified,” where fit examines the extent of alignment between the unique 
characteristics of candidate and program, in addition to conformance with some 
minimal qualification standards.  Selection should be accomplished at the level at 
which that determination of fit is best made.  
While the analysis suggested a positive effect on outcomes with civilian PMs, 
the results were mixed.  Thus, there is no strong basis for preferring one status (i.e., 
military or civilian) over another for PM, though it seems reasonable to ensure 
representation of both in the program’s management structures.  Whether that 
balance results from a military PM with a civilian deputy or vice versa may likely be 
determined more by personnel management constraints rather than by any other 
factors.21  
Because no significant correlation between PM tenure and outcomes was 
found, the past emphasis on tenure is misplaced.  A contingency approach to PM 
                                            
21 Previous discussion indicated the difficulty in making changes to the military personnel system. 
Regarding civilians, one senior career management official who chose to remain anonymous noted 
that the low numbers of civilian PMs was due to low numbers of applicants for those positions, often 
because civilians do not want to relocate to the locality of the PM’s office.  Uniformed officers, in 
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career management would focus, rather, on ensuring that, at any given time, a 
proper balance of fresh perspectives and continuity is maintained. 
Retain decentralized PM career management.  The history of policy on PM 
professionalism reflects tendencies toward centralization (e.g., of policy authority) 
and standardization (e.g., of qualifications for assignment).  In contrast, this paper’s 
analysis and arguments support decentralized management of the PM workforce so 
as to facilitate contingency approaches, such as “best fit” qualification and 
assignment criteria.   
Decentralized PM career management would not, of course, be inconsistent 
with the provision of centralized resources to enhance PM professionalism, such as 
those DoD-wide training, education, and knowledge-sharing resources provided by 
the DAU.      
Eliminate requirements for PM waivers.  Waivers militate against “best fit” 
assignment criteria.  Waivers appear to have no functions other than as an 
accountability measure and to discourage assignment of PMs who do not meet 
minimum standards.  Waiver requirements implicitly call into question the judgment 
of those who request and approve waivers.     
Do not abandon PM professionalization.  Finally, this study should not be 
read as an argument that investments in PM professionalization should not continue.  
The author has no doubt that PMs have significant influences—sometimes good and 
sometimes bad—over their programs, only that the traditional ways of viewing those 
influences are inadequate.  The author often states the view that defense acquisition 
PMs have “the hardest job in the world” and, accordingly, they merit the best 
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